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L Facts
Arthur Ray Jenkins, Ell ("Jenkins"), spent the day of October 12, 1990,
drinking whiskey and beer with his younger brother, Kevin Frame
("Frame").2 Around 10:00 p.m. that evening, Jenkins and Frame returned
to the house owned by Jenkins's aunt where Jenkins had been living since
his release from prison one month earlier.3 Jenkins's uncle and Lee
Brinklow, both residents of the house, were present when Jenkins and
Frame arrived.4 An argument ensued in the living room between Jenkins
and Brinklow concerning Frame's presence in the house.' Jenkins pro-
ceeded to Brinklow's bedroom, returned with a single shot .22 caliber rifle,
and shot Brinklow once in the face.6 Jenkins then entered another bedroom
where his uncle lay in bed and shot him.7 Jenkins and Frame then obtained
two butcher knives from the kitchen and brought Brinklow into the bed-
room with the uncle.8 Both Brinklow and Jenkins's uncle were still alive at
this point.9 Jenkins shot the uncle again in the head, stabbed him multiple
times, and shot Brinklow again in the head." Jenkins and Frame left the
scene in Brinklow's truck after taking money and other items from the
house. "
Jenkins was convicted of two counts of capital murder and given two
death sentences.-" The convictions and sentences were affirmed by the
1. This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions" at 168 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 1999). Jenkins was executed by lethal
injection on April 20, 1999.










12. Id., at *1.
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Supreme Court of Virginia.13 After exhausting his state post-conviction
remedies, Jenkins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 4 The district
court denied the petition."
On appeal from the district court, Jenkins presented the following four
claims to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: (1) the
Commonwealth's failure to turn over exculpatory evidence as required
under Brady v. Maryland6 and subsequent knowing use of false testimony
regarding this evidence violated his due process rights; 7 (2) he received
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment; (3) the
trial court denied him a competent mental health expert and an adequate
mental exam in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma;" and (4) the use of his confes-
sions at trial violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to be free from compulsory self-incrimination.
IL Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of the petition, finding all of Jenkins's claims to be
defaulted or without merit. 9
III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Due Process Claims
Jenkins alleged that he had been had been sexually abused by the head
jailer at the Washington County (Virginia) jail while incarcerated prior to
the instant offense.2 This abuse, according to Jenkins, affected his mental
state at the time of the murders and was thus exculpatory evidence. 2'
13. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 360 (Va. 1992).
14. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *1.
15. Id.
16. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution").
17. Although the court of appeals did not enumerate the grounds for this due process
claim, it is a settled principle that the prosecution's knowing elicitation of false testimony,
or failure to correct testimony it knows to be false, violates a defendant's due process rights.
See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957).
18. 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that when an indigent criminal defendant demon-
strates that his sanity at the time of the offense will be a "significant factor" at trial, the
defendant is entitled to "access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense").
19. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *1.
20. Id., at *3.
21. Id. Such evidence would be relevant only in mitigation at the penalty phase as in
Virginia "evidence of a criminal defendant's mental state at the time of the offense is, in the
(Vol. 11.:2
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Jenkins raised the following due process claims stemming from the alleged
abuse: (1) that the Commonwealth failed to turn over this evidence in viola-
tion of Brady v. Maryland;" and (2) that the Commonwealth elicited false
testimony from the head jailer concerning his relationship with Jenkins at
the trial's penalty phase.23
The court of appeals found both these claims to be procedurally de-
faulted as they had not been raised in prior state proceedings. 24 Furthermore,
Jenkins could not show "cause" for his failure to present the claims in state
court as the information sought was known to Jenkins and was thus "'rea-
sonably available"' to him. 25 Nor could Jenkins establish that a "'funda-
mental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a federal
evidentiary hearing"' on the claims.26 The court of appeals proceeded,
however, to reject Jenkins's Brady claim on the merits. Assuming that the
alleged abuse did in fact occur, there was no evidence that any agent of the
Commonwealth, other than the head jailer, had knowledge of the abuse.28
In addition, the court of appeals followed its prior holding in United States v.
Wilson2 1 that "'where the exculpatory information is not only available to the
defendant but also lies in a source where a reasonable defendant would have
looked, a defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the Brady doctrine.""'3
absence of an insanity defense, irrelevant to the issue of guilt." Stamper v. Commonwealth,
324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Va. 1985). Although the "voluntary intoxication" defense provides a
limited exception to this rule, it rarely provides grounds for appellate relief. See, e.g.,
Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 99 (Va. 1980) (holding that the voluntary
intoxication defense is unavailable where there is "abundant credible evidence" that the
defendant was capable of deliberation and premeditation at the time of the offense).
22. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See supra note 16.
23. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *3.
24. ld.
25. ld. (quoting Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 976 (4th Cir. 1995)). Under Keeney
v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11 (1992), a federal habeas court may hear a procedurally
defaulted claim if the petitioner can show "cause for his failure to develop the facts in state-
court proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that failure." As the court of appeals
injenkins did not find cause to excuse the procedural default, the court did not reach the issue
of actual prejudice.
26. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *3 (quoting Keeney, 504 U.S. at 12). Apart from showing
cause" and "actual prejudice," a habeas petitioner may resurrect a procedurally defaulted
claim in federal court by satisfying the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" standard articu-
lated by the court of appeals. Id. (citing Keeney, 504 U.S. at 12).
27. Investigations by both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and an expert investiga-
tor appointed by the district court in Jenkins's habeas proceedings uncovered no evidence
that the head jailer engaged in an improper relationship with Jenkins although the jailer was
indicted for crimes involving his homosexual relations with other inmates. Id.
28. Id., at *4.
29. 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1990).
30. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *4 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 381
(4th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The construction of the Brady doctrine
adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Wilson and subsequent decisions such as Hoke v. Netberland,
1999]
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Jenkins had knowledge of his own sexual abuse by the head jailer and pro-
duced no valid reason why he was incapable of sharing this information with
his attorneys.3' As such, the court of appeals held that there could have been
no Brady violation even if other agents of the Commonwealth knew of the
alleged abuse and failed to turn over such information to Jenkins.32
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
At trial, Jenkins requested and received the services of a clinical psychol-
ogist, Dr. Gary L. Hawk, to assist in his defense." Defense counsel obtained
a large volume of Jenkins's records for Dr. Hawk to review in performing
a psychological evaluation of Jenkins. 4 In addition, counsel sought but did
not receive approximately eight hundred pages of medical records from the
Department of Corrections ("DOC") covering a five-year period during
which Jenkins was incarcerated for prior offenses.3" At habeas, Jenkins
contended that his trial counsel's failure to obtain the DOC records consti-
tuted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.36
Under Strickland v. Washington,7 Jenkins was required to show both
(1) that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.38 The
court of appeals found that Jenkins had failed to meet either of the Strick-
land requirements." Relying largely on defense counsel's statement to the
trial court that Dr. Hawk felt "'relatively certain that the eventual conclu-
sions would not change based upon the receipt of the DOC records, '"' the
92 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1990), may be in doubt. The United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Strickler v. Pruett, Nos. 97-29, 97-30, 1998 WL 340420 (4th Cr. June 17, 1998),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 40 (1998), to determine whether the Fourth Circuit's construction of
Brady is correct. However, even a favorable ruling for Strickler will probably not affect cases
such as Jenkins, where there is no evidence that any agent of the Commonwealth knew of the
existence of the allegedly exculpatory evidence, and defendant presumably had actual
knowledge of the evidence.
31. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *4. The court of appeals rejected Jenkins's claim that a
mental illness prevented him from revealing the alleged abuse to his attorneys. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id., at *5. In Virginia, an indigent capital defendant has the right to the assistance
of one or more court-appointed mental health experts. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1
(Michie 1998).
34. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *5.
35. Id. Dr. Hawk stated that obtaining the DOC records was important "because
Jenkins had been incarcerated for much of the time between ages 12 and 21, the age when he
committed the double murders in this case." Id.
36. Id.
37. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
38. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
39. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *6.
40. Id., at *5.
[Vol. 11:2
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court of appeals concluded that counsel was not unreasonable in failing to
ensure that Dr. Hawk obtained the records."' With regard to Strickland's
prejudice requirement, the court adopted the district court's finding that Dr.
Hawk's ultimate opinion was not substantially altered by the fact of the
missing records, that the records actually supported the Commonwealth's
evidence of Jenkins's future dangerousness, and that counsel's failure to
obtain the records thus did not prejudice Jenkins. 2
Little may be gleaned from the court's treatment of Jenkins's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Since its inception, the Strickland standard has
proved to be a heavy burden for defendants to shoulder. However, the issue
of the DOC records is noteworthy for another reason. Although defense
counsel was ultimately unable to procure the DOC records, the fact remains
that he attempted to provide Dr. Hawk with all potentially relevant records
concerning Jenkins's mental health history. In doing so, it appears that
defense counsel made an effort to equip Dr. Hawk with the necessary
resources to perform a meaningful psychological evaluation, thus working
to provide the metal health expert with the best opportunity to assist in the
defense effort. It is disappointing that no mention is made of any reason for
the DOC's failure to release the records.
C, Ake Claim
Jenkins argued that he was "denied a competent mental health expert
and the right to an adequate mental health evaluation"43 in violation of Ake
v. Oklahoma." As previously stated, Jenkins requested and received the
assistance of Dr. Hawk, a clinical psychologist. The court of appeals held
that Ake is not violated where the defendant chooses the services of a
psychologist rather that a psychiatrist.4 Furthermore, the court ruled
Jenkins could not raise a claim under Ake challenging the competency of
Dr. Hawk's evaluation as Ake as does not guarantee a "particular substantive
result" from the psychological evaluation.' Based on these determinations,
the court ruled that Jenkins's rights under Ake were not violated.47
41. Id., at *6.
42. Id., at *7.
43. Id., at *1.
44. 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that when an indigent criminal defendant demon-
strates that his sanity at the time of the offense will be a "significant factor" at trial, the
defendant is entitled to "access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense").
45. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *7.
46. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 401 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
536 (1998)). See Anne Duprey, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 175 (1998) (analyzing Wilson v.
Greene, 155 F.3d 396 (4th Ci. 1998), and discussing the issue of Ake's guarantee of a compe-
tent psychological examination).




Subsequent to his arrest, Jenkins made two videotaped confessions to
police.4" Prior to the first confession, a police investigator informed Jenkins
that "he could have an attorney present. 49 An exchange followed in which
Jenkins expressed reservations about proceeding without an attorney and
the investigator assured him that an attorney was not necessary if he would
tell the truth." Jenkins ultimately confessed without an attorney present."1
The following day authorities gave Jenkins "a more traditional Miranda
warning." 2 Jenkins waived his Miranda rights and confessed a second
time. 3 Both confessions were admitted at trial over Jenkins's objection.'
At habeas, Jenkins argued that the investigator's comments to Jenkins
before the first confession concerning Jenkins's right to an attorney ren-
dered the confession involuntary in violation of the Fifth Amendment." As
such, this confession was inadmissible and his second confession was also
required to be suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 6
However, the court of appeals deftly sidestepped a consideration of the
merits of this argument by analyzing Jenkins's claim as though the first
confession was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment but obtained in
violation of Miranda. Under this reasoning, even though the first confession
would be inadmissible, the second confession would be admissible if volun-
tarily made after proper waiver of Miranda warnings.5"
psychiatrist and an appropriate examination. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83 (emphasis added). This will
often require the appointment of multiple mental health experts, for example, where there
are indicators of both mental illness and mental retardation.
48. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *8.
49. id.
50. Id. As summarized by the court of appeals, after Jenkins asked the investigator
whether an attorney would be helpful, the following exchange took place:
Investigator: Well, that depends on whether or not you want to tell the truth.
Jenkins: That ain't going to hurt me in the courtroom?
Investigator: No. Uh, I told you evidence is going to p rove what is true. And









57. Id. Under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985), "a suspect who has once
responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his
rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings." The Fourth
Circuit has interpreted Elstad as requiring a constitutional violation in order to apply the
[Vol. 11:2
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Even if both confessions were erroneously admitted at the guilt phase,
the court of appeals found that the harmless error doctrine precluded habeas
relief for Jenkins as he had admitted the killings to "almost everyone with
whom he talked subsequent to the day in question." 8 Jenkins also argued
that the confessions, in which he described the killings "in graphic detail
with little sign of remorse," had a substantial and injurious effect on the
penalty phase. 9 However, the court of appeals held this claim to be proce-
durally defaulted as it had not been raised in the prior state proceedings."
The court's procedural default ruling raises a potential red flag for
defense counsel. If a confession may possibly be used by the prosecution at
both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, a general motion to suppress
the statement as involuntary or in violation of Miranda or Edwards may not
be sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Rather, defense
counsel must object to the statement's use at both the guilt and the penalty
phases to preserve the claim for federal habeas review.
David D. Leshner
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 413 (4th Cir.
1997) (en banc) (holding that "[t]he 'tainted fruits' doctrine is simply inapplicabi zbsent a
constitutional violation"). Under Howard, a statement obtained in violation of Miranda or
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), is not itself a constitutional violation and does not
provide a basis for suppression of further incriminating statements. Howard, 131 F.3d at 414.
Defense counsel facing a situation in which a client has made multiple confessions
(assuming that the subsequent confessions are voluntary and obtained in compliance with
Miranda) must argue, as Jenkins's counsel attempted to do, that the first confession was
involuntary under the Fifth Amendment. An involuntary confession is a direct constitu-
tional violation and will allow for application of the "tainted fruits" doctrine to subsequent
confessions. Id. at 415. Establishing that the initial confession was involuntary is not easy.
"[G]oercive police activity" is an initial prerequisite to a finding of involuntariness. Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). Furthermore, the defendant must establish that in
making the statement "his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired." Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). However, only by
proving that the initial confession was involuntary will defense counsel be able to argue for
suppression of the subsequent confessions.
58. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *8 (quoting Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 360,
363 (Va. 1992)). Constitutional error provides a ground for federal habeas relief only where
the petitioner establishes that the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 766 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59. Jenkins, 1999 WL 9944, at *8.
60. Id.
1999]

